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Abstract—Denial of service (DoS) attacks and more 
particularly the distributed ones (DDoS) are one of the latest 
threat and pose a grave danger to users, organizations and 
infrastructures of the Internet. Several schemes have been 
proposed on how to detect some of these attacks, but they suffer 
from a range of problems, some of them being impractical and 
others not being effective against these attacks. This paper 
reports the design principles and evaluation results of our 
proposed framework that autonomously detects and accurately 
characterizes a wide range of flooding DDoS attacks in ISP 
network. Attacks are detected by the constant monitoring of 
propagation of abrupt traffic changes inside ISP network. For 
this, a newly designed flow-volume based approach (FVBA) is 
used to construct profile of the traffic normally seen in the 
network, and identify anomalies whenever traffic goes out of 
profile. Consideration of varying tolerance factors make 
proposed detection system scalable to the varying network 
conditions and attack loads in real time. Six-sigma method is 
used to identify threshold values accurately for malicious flows 
characterization. FVBA has been extensively evaluated in a 
controlled test-bed environment. Detection thresholds and 
efficiency is justified using receiver operating characteristics 
(ROC) curve. For validation, KDD 99, a publicly available 
benchmark dataset is used. The results show that our proposed 
system gives a drastic improvement in terms of detection and 
false alarm rate.  
Index Terms—Distributed Denial of Service Attacks, False 
Positives, False Negatives, ISP Network, Network Security.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, DDoS attack is the most disastrous and 
difficult threat to the Internet. It is commonly characterized 
as an event in which a large number of unwitting hosts are 
used as an attack force against the victim to exhaust either 
their computational or communication resources. As a result, 
legitimate users are denied from the services that they 
normally expect to have [1]. Therefore, as given by Weiler [2] 
DDoS attacks attempt: (1) to inhibit legitimate network 
traffic by flooding the network with useless traffic. (2) to 
deny access to a service by disrupting connections between 
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two parties. (3) to block the access of a particular individual 
to a service. (4) to disrupt the specific system or service itself. 
Intruder can perform DDoS attacks either as flooding attacks 
or as logical attacks. These attacks reveal big loopholes not 
only in specific applications, but also in the entire TCP/IP 
protocol suite. Series of DDoS attacks that shut down some 
high profile websites have demonstrated the severe 
consequences of these attacks [3]. As per computer crime and 
security survey conducted by FBI/CSI in the United States 
for the year 2004 [4], these attacks are the second most 
widely detected outsider attack types in computer networks 
immediately after virus infections. A computer crime and 
security survey conducted in Australia for the year 2004 [5] 
shows similar results. Technologies, such as cable modems to 
home users, have further increased the risk of DDoS attacks. 
This is because with the cable modems the home users are 
always connected to the Internet and it is easier for an 
attacker to compromise these systems, which often have 
weak security [6]. 
Currently, the majority (90-94%) of DDoS attacks are 
performed using TCP, and a large portion (52-57%) of them 
is targeted to flooding attacks [7]. Therefore, we concentrate 
on thwarting a wide range of flooding attacks. Flooding 
DDoS attacks performed by attackers can be broadly 
categorized in following three categories:  
High rate disruptive: In high rate disruptive attacks, sheer 
volume of packets at very high rate are sent from distributed 
locations in a coordinated manner to completely disrupt the 
availability of Internet services. As these attacks have direct 
impact on ISP networks, thus easy to detect and characterize. 
Diluted low rate degrading: In diluted low rate degrading 
attacks, packets are sent from a large number of infected 
machines i.e. zombie machines at low rate in a coordinated 
manner to gracefully degrade network performance. As these 
attacks degrade Quality of Service (QoS) of the network 
slowly, thus very difficult to detect and characterize. 
Varied rate: To make detection of attacks more difficult, 
attackers can use some sophisticated attack tools to generate 
varied rate attacks in which they use some of the zombie 
machines to generate packets at high rate while remaining 
machines to generate packets at low rate. This type of attacks 
is toughest to detect and characterize from entropy based 
approaches.  
Over the recent years, several schemes have been proposed 
to detect flooding DDoS attacks [8]-[22]. Most of them are 
able to detect high rate disruptive attacks while ineffective 
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against other flooding attacks. This is because of difficulty in 
constructing profile of normal traffic to detect anomalies, 
when system is under diluted low rate degrading attacks. 
Entropy based approaches [19]-[21] can detect diluted low 
rate degrading attacks, but failed against varied rate attacks 
wherein intelligent attacker mixes low and high rate zombie 
machines to generate attack traffic in such a manner that 
overall entropy remain unchanged. 
In this paper, we present a novel framework that 
concentrates on detection and characterization of a wide 
range of flooding DDoS attacks, e.g. high rate disruptive, 
diluted low rate degrading and varied rate, by monitoring the 
propagation of abrupt traffic changes inside ISP network. 
Early version of our framework is presented in [23]. A newly 
designed Flow-Volume Based Approach (FVBA) is used to 
construct profile of the traffic normally seen in the network, 
and identify anomalies whenever traffic goes out of profile. 
Proposed detection system is scalable to varying network 
conditions and adapts itself to different attacks loads. 
Six-sigma [24], [25] method is used to identify threshold 
values accurately for malicious flows characterization. 
Internet type topologies used for simulation are generated 
using Transit-Stub model of GT-ITM [26] topology 
generator. NS-2 [27] network simulator on Linux platform is 
used as simulation test-bed. A publicly available benchmark 
dataset, KDD 99 [28], is used to validate the efficiency and 
effectiveness of proposed approach. The results show that 
our proposed scheme inflicts an extremely high detection rate 
with low false alarm rate. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section II briefly reviews related work. Section III describes 
proposed approach and its advantages in the details. Section 
IV contains experimental setup and performance analysis. 
Validation of proposed approach with real data is reported in 
section V. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper and 
outlines future work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
This section charts out the overview on a plethora of 
existing DDoS defense schemes proposed in the literature. 
Exiting DDoS defense mechanisms are classified into four 
broad categories: Prevention, Detection, Response, and 
Tolerance & mitigation. However, research on DDoS attacks 
is primarily focused on attack detection and response 
mechanisms. Attack detection aims to detect an ongoing 
attack and to discriminate malicious traffic from legitimate 
traffic. Typical detection techniques fall into four categories: 
signature based attack detection, anomaly based attack 
detection, hybrid attack detection and third party attack 
detection. In the signature based detection techniques, 
database of attack signatures is used to detect attacks. The 
signatures are manually constructed by security experts 
analyzing previous attacks and used to match with incoming 
traffic to detect intrusions. SNORT [8] and Bro [9] are the 
two widely used signature based detection approaches. 
Signature based techniques are only effective in detecting 
traffic of known DDoS attacks whereas new attacks or even 
slight variations of old attacks go unnoticed.  
Anomaly based detection techniques on the other hand, 
relies on constructing profile of valid traffic patterns and 
identifies anomalies whenever traffic goes out of profile. 
Most of DoS detection systems [10]-[20] are anomaly based. 
In [10], Gil and Poletto proposed a scheme called MULTOPS 
to detect denial of service attacks by monitoring the packet 
rate in both the up and down links. MULTOPS assumes that 
packet rates between two hosts are proportional during 
normal operation. A significant disproportion between the 
packet rate going to and from a host or subnet is a strong 
indication of a DoS attack. Blazek et al. [11] proposed batch 
detection to detect DoS attacks by monitoring statistical 
changes. Lee and Stolfo [12] used data mining techniques to 
discover patterns of system features that describe program 
and user behavior and implement a classifier that can 
recognize anomalies and intrusions. A mechanism called 
congestion triggered packet sampling and filtering is 
proposed by Huang et al. [13]. According to this approach, a 
subset of dropped packets due to congestion is selected for 
statistical analysis. If anomaly is indicated by the statistical 
results, a signal is sent to the router to filter the malicious 
packets. Cheng et al. [14] proposed to use spectral analysis to 
identify DoS attack flows. Mirkovic et al. [15] proposed 
D-WARD defense system that does DDoS attack detection at 
source, based on the idea that DDoS attacks should be 
stopped as close to the source as possible. In [16], flow 
belonging to DoS attacks is identified by considering high 
traffic volume to the victim. Then right drop probability for 
such traffic is calculated and conveys this information to the 
upstream routers, which in turn could drop packets belonging 
to the attack traffic themselves. Bencsath et al. [17] have 
given a traffic level measurement based approach, in which 
incoming traffic is monitored continuously and dangerous 
traffic intensity rises are detected. Chen et al. [18] used 
distributed change-point detection (DCD) architecture using 
change aggregation trees (CAT) to detect DDoS attack over 
multiple network domains. Anomaly based techniques can 
detect novel attacks; however, it may result in higher false 
alarms. 
Hybrid detection approaches [22] combine the positive 
features of the signature and anomaly based detection models 
to achieve high detection rate with low false positives. Even 
though it decreases false positive rate but complexity and 
cost of implementation of hybrid attack detection system is 
very high. Mechanisms that deploy third-party detection do 
not handle the detection process themselves, but rely on an 
external third-party that signals the occurrence of the attack 
[23]. Examples of mechanisms that use third-party detection 
are easily found among traceback mechanisms [29]-[31]. 
Though most of DoS detection systems [8]-[18], use volume 
based metrics to detect and characterize DDoS attacks and 
have been successful in countering high rate disruptive 
flooding attacks, but diluted low rate flooding attacks can not 
be detected and characterized because these attacks do not 
cause detectable disruptions in traffic volume. These suffer in 
the form large number of false positives and false negatives 
hence more collateral damage when attack is carried at slow 
rate or when volume per attack flow is not so high as 
compared to legitimate flows. On the other hand, entropy 
based DDoS detection approaches in [19]-[21] can counter 
diluted low rate degrading flooding attacks too, but 
International Journal of Computer Theory and Engineering, Vol. 1, No. 1, April 2009 
1793-821X 
 
 
- 73 -                                                  
ineffective against varied rate attacks. 
Attack response systems attempt to alleviate the damage 
caused by the attacks by taking proactive measures [32], [33] 
or reactive measures like localizing the source of the attacks 
using traceback approaches [29]-[31], by filtering malicious 
traffic if characterized correctly [34], or reducing intensity of 
attacks using rate throttling approaches [15], [16], [35]. 
III. OUR APPROACH  
After analyzing various existing DDoS defense techniques, 
we find that major challenge of defense against DDoS attacks 
is how to detect and identify the attack traffic accurately and 
efficiently. Therefore, by considering this challenge 
proposed framework aims to provide following activities in 
thwarting DDoS attacks:  
Detection:  Detects a wide range of flooding DDoS attacks 
i.e. high rate disruptive, diluted low rate degrading and varied 
rate autonomously in ISP network while victim is being 
attacked 
Malicious Flows Characterization: Identifies and tags 
attack flows accurately in real time. 
Rest of the section describes proposed framework in 
details.  
A. Detection 
Here, we will discuss propose detection system that is part 
of access router or can belong to separate unit that interact 
with access router to detect attack traffic. Detecting DDoS 
attacks involve first knowing normal profile of the system 
and then to find deviations from this normal profile. 
Whenever incoming traffic goes out of the normal profile, 
anomalous system behavior is identified. Our approach 
detects flooding DDoS attacks by the constant monitoring the 
propagation of abrupt traffic changes inside the ISP network. 
Various statistical measures e.g. volume, flow, entropy, ratio 
etc are available for profile generation. A high-level block 
diagram of DDoS detection system is given in fig. 1.   
A newly designed flow-volume based approach (FVBA) is 
used to construct profile of the traffic normally seen in the 
network, and identify anomalies whenever traffic goes out of 
profile.  In FVBA, two statistical measures namely volume 
and flow are used for profile construction. Fig. 2 depicts the 
FVBA architecture, where ( )inX t represents total traffic 
arriving at the target machine in Δ time duration, when 
system is under attacks. ( )inX t  can be expressed as follows: 
( )inX t =
*( )nX t +
ˆ ( )X t ,          (1) 
where, *( )nX t and 
ˆ ( )X t  are the components of the normal 
and attack traffic respectively.  
Feature
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Fig. 1 High-level block diagram of DDoS detection system 
( )inX t -
*( )nX t  using above equation can be used for 
detection purpose.  
To set normal profile, consider a random process { ( )X t , t 
= w D , Nw Î }, where Δ is a constant time interval, N is the 
set of positive integers, and for each t, X (t) is a random 
variable. 1 lw£ £ , l is the number of time intervals.  Here X 
(t) represents the total traffic volume in {t − Δ, t} time 
interval. X (t) is calculated during time interval {t − Δ, t} as 
follows:   
1
( ) , 1,2....
Nf
i f
i
X t n i N
=
= =å         (2) 
  where ni represent total number of bytes arrivals for a 
flow i in {t − Δ, t} time duration and fN represent total 
number of flows. We take average of X (t) and designate that 
as *( )nX t normal traffic Volume. Similarly value of flow 
metric is calculated and designates that as *( )nF t . Here total 
bytes, not packets, are used to calculate volume metric, 
because it provides more accuracy, as different flows can 
contain packets of different sizes. 
To detect the attack, the value of volume 
metric ( )inX t and flow metric ( )inF t is calculated in time 
window Δ continuously; whenever there is appreciable 
deviation from *( )nX t and
*( )nF t , various types of attacks 
are detected using algorithm 1 as given in fig. 3. Threshold 
values thx , 
L
thx and thV  are set as follows: 
1 *th Vrx s=                                    (3) 
     2 *th FrV s=                          (4) 
                    3 *
L
th Vrx s=               (5) 
where Vs , Fs represents value of standard deviation for 
volume measure and flow measure, respectively. 1 3,r r IÎ , 
represent value of upper and lower bound of tolerance factor 
for volume measure, respectively, where I is a set of integers. 
2r IÎ , represent value of tolerance factor for flow measure.    
Effectiveness of an anomaly based detection system highly 
depends on accuracy of threshold value settings. Inaccurate 
threshold values cause a large number of false positives and 
false negatives. Therefore, various simulations are performed 
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using different value of tolerance factors. The choice of 
tolerance factors varies for different network conditions. 
Values of tolerance factors also depend on the composition of 
the normal traffic and the desired degree of the ability to 
control a DDoS attack.  
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Fig. 2 FVBA architecture 
Fig. 3 Algorithm for DDoS attacks Detection 
Usually UDP traffic is conducted using few connections and 
occupies a small percentage of all the network traffic 
therefore lower bound of volume measure is also used for 
UDP type of attacks detection.  
B. Malicious Flows Characterization 
Our aim in this paper is to detect and characterize a wide 
range of DDoS attacks in ISP network under varying network 
conditions and validate proposed system with real dataset. 
For the sake of completion, we describe the characterization 
mechanism, as proposed in [23], in this section. 
Once attacks occurrence is detected, next thing to do is 
correctly separation of traffic coming through malicious 
flows from legitimate traffic to respond to attacks correctly. 
For this, we observed total number of the bytes arrival for 
each flow during monitoring period, and flows that crosses 
predefined thresholds are classify either suspicious or attack 
traffic flows depending on deflection from thresholds. 
Assume F  is the set of active flows, then 
( normal attackF F F= È ) AND ( )normal attackF F fÇ = , 
where normalF  represent set of actual normal flows and 
attackF  is set of actual attack flows. 
Characterization algorithm outputs subsets *attackF , 
*
suspiciousF of F . Here, 
*
attackF  and 
*
suspiciousF  represent set of 
attack and malicious flows respectively, given as output by 
our characterization algorithm. Ideally 
* *( ) ( )attack attack attack attack normalF F F AND F F fÇ = Ç = and 
*( )suspicious normalF F fÇ = AND
*( )suspiciousF f= . Six-sigma concept is 
used to calculate the Upper Control Limit (UCL) and Lower 
Control Limit (LCL) values of thresholds in order to 
differentiate the normal, suspicious and attack state of the 
total number of bytes arrival for each flow. We use the 
subscript ‘ss’ to represent ‘suspicious state’ and ‘as’ to 
represent ‘attack state’.  
C. Six-Sigma method used to identify threshold values: 
Six-Sigma method [24], [25] is a systematic innovative 
activity to statistically measure and analyze causes of defects 
that happen in all parts of management, and then remove 
those causes by identification of thresholds of the significant 
metrics which are measured with help of the data collected 
from the process. It is proposed by Motorola to address 
quality problem and business improvement. Six-Sigma 
claims that focusing on reduction of variation will solve 
process and business problems. By using a set of statistical 
tools to understand the fluctuation of a process, management 
can begin to predict the expected outcome of that process. If 
the outcome is not satisfactory, associated tools can be used 
to further understand the elements influencing that process. 
Using Six-Sigma there would be approximately 3.4 or fewer 
failures per billion attempts. This is an extremely low rate of 
failure. It has been demonstrated that six sigma 
methodologies, integrated with rigorous statistics, can be 
flexible, powerful and successful without being either overly 
simplistic or inordinately cumbersome [36]. To find 
six-sigma, calculate sigma or standard deviation, multiply by 
6, and add or subtract the result to the calculated mean. Hence, 
to achieve extremely low false positives and negatives, 
six-sigma method is used in our attack flows characterization 
approach to identify the threshold values. Theoretical control 
 
Algorithm 1: DDoS attacks Detection Algorithm 
Input: * ( )nX t : Normal traffic Volume measure 
* ( )nF t : Normal traffic Flow measure 
thx : Upper  bound of Threshold value for Volume measure 
thV : Threshold value for Flow measure 
L
thx : Lower bound of threshold value for Volume measure 
Output: DDoS attack alert generation. 
Procedure: 
01: Consider a random process { ( )inX t , ( )inF t , t = w D , 
Nw Î }, where Δ is a constant time interval, N is the set of 
positive integers, and for each t , ( )inX t and ( )inF t  are 
random variables. 1 lw£ £ , l is the number of time 
intervals. Here, ( )inX t represents value of volume measure 
and ( )inF t  represents value of flow measure in time duration 
{t−Δ, t}. 
02: If (( *( ) ( )in n thX t X t x- > ) || (
*( ) ( )in n thF t F t V- > )) Then 
Attack pattern detected. // in case of TCP and ICMP flooding  
attacks  
DDoS attack alert is generated. 
03: Else If (( *( ) ( )in n thX t X t x- < ) && (
*( ) ( )in n thF t F t V- < )) 
Then System is attack free. 
Attack alert is not generated. 
04: If (( *( ) ( )in n thX t X t x- > ) || (
*( ) ( ) Lin n thX t X t x- < ) || 
( *( ) ( )in n thF t F t V- > )) Then Attack pattern detected. // in 
case of UDP flooding attack  
DDoS attack alert is generated. 
05: Else If (( *( ) ( )in n thX t X t x- < ) && (
*( ) ( ) Lin n thX t X t x- > ) 
&& ( *( ) ( )in n thF t F t V- < )) Then System is attack free. 
Attack alert is not generated. 
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limits of UCL and LCL for suspicious state are represented as 
follows: 
3ssUCL m s= +              (6) 
3ssUCL m s= -                        (7) 
where, UCLss and LCLss represents a 3 x sigma upwards 
and downwards deviation from the mean value of per flow 
total number of bytes arrival, respectively. For normally 
distributed output, 99.7% should fall between UCLss and 
LCLss. Theoretical control limits of UCL and LCL for attack 
state are represented as: 
6asUCL m s= +              (8) 
6asUCL m s= -                      (9)  
where, UCLas and LCLas represents a 6 x sigma upwards 
and downwards deviation from the mean value of per flow 
total number of bytes arrival, respectively. For normally 
distributed output, 99.97% should fall between UCLas and 
LCLas. Here m  and s  represents mean and standard 
deviation of per flow total bytes arrival, respectively, when 
system is attack free.  
Therefore, flows which have total number of the bytes 
arrival during monitoring period is greater than UCLas or 
smaller than LCLas are considered attack flows. The values 
between LCLss and UCLss are considered to be under normal 
state. Flows, which have total number of the bytes arrival 
during monitoring period is between UCLas and UCLss or 
between LCLas and LCLss are considered suspicious flows. 
There can still be false positives and negatives due to flash 
crowd. To further reduce false positive negatives, flows that 
are active in previous time window are omitted from list of 
attack flows. Thus, all the packets coming through 
flows *attackF  are filtered at edge routers. Rate throttling 
strategy is applied to packets coming through flows *suspiciousF . 
Rate of packets coming through flows *suspiciousF  is throttled 
according to strength of attack. If incoming rate of attack 
traffic is high, packets coming through flows *suspiciousF  are 
throttle with high rate and vice versa. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
In this section, we evaluate our proposed scheme using 
simulations. The simulations are carried out using NS-2 [27] 
network simulator. We show that false positives and false 
negatives triggered by our algorithm are very less. This 
implies that profiles built are reasonably stable and 
characterizes malicious traffic correctly.  
A. Simulation Environment 
Presently, the Internet can be viewed as a collection of 
interconnected routing domains, which are groups of nodes 
under a common administration that share routing 
information. A primary characteristic of these domains is 
routing locality, in which the path between any two nodes in 
a domain remains entirely within the domain. Thus, each 
routing domain in the Internet can be classified as either a 
stub or a transit domain [37], [38]. A domain is a stub domain 
if the path connecting nodes N1 and N2 passes through that 
domain and if either N1 or N2 is located in that domain. 
Transit domains do not have this restriction. The purpose of 
transit domains is to interconnect stub domains efficiently. 
Thus, real-world Internet type topologies generated using 
Transit-Stub model of GT-ITM [26] topology generator is 
used to test our proposed scheme, where transit domains are 
treated as different Internet Service Provider (ISP) network 
i.e. Autonomous System (AS). For simulations, we use ISP 
level topology, which contains four transit domains with each 
domain contain twelve transit nodes i.e. transit routers. All 
the four transit domains have two peer links at transit nodes 
with adjacent transit domains. Remaining ten transit nodes 
are connected to ten stub domain, one stub domain per transit 
node. Stub domains are used to connect transit domains with  
ISP Network
Client Machine
Router
Zombie Machine
Server
 
Fig. 4 A short scale simulation topology 
customer domains, as each stub domain contains a 
customer domain with ten legitimate client machines. So total 
of four hundred legitimate client machines are used to 
generate background traffic. Total zombie machines range 
between 10 and 100 to generate attack traffic. Transit domain 
four contains the server machine to be attacked by zombie 
machines. A short scale simulation topology is shown in fig. 
4. 
Currently, the majority of the DDoS attacks are TCP 
flooding, so we will consider detection of a wide range of 
TCP flooding attacks in this section. The legitimate clients 
are TCP agents that request files of size 1 Mbps with request 
inter-arrival times drawn from a Poisson distribution. The 
attackers are modeled by UDP agents. A UDP connection is 
used instead of a TCP one because in a practical attack flow, 
the attacker would normally never follow the basic rules of 
TCP, i.e. waiting for ACK packets before the next window of 
outstanding packets can be sent, etc. The attack traffic rate 
varies from 0.1 to 3.5 Mbps per attack daemon. False positive 
alarm number increases steadily with increasing monitoring 
window size as shown in fig. 5. Even false positive rate is 
minimum using window size 100 ms but detection rate is 
very less i.e. 74 % using this value. Therefore, in our 
experiments, the monitoring time window was set to 200 ms, 
as the typical domestic Internet RTT is around 100 ms and 
the average global Internet RTT is 140 ms [39]. Total false 
positive alarms are minimum with high detection rate using 
this value of monitoring window. The simulations are 
repeated and different attack scenarios are compared by 
varying total number of zombie machines and at different 
attack strengths.  
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Fig. 6 shows temporal variation of volume metric when (a) 
system is in normal condition, (b) under low rate DDoS 
attack and (c) under high rate DDoS attack. 
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Fig. 5 Variation of false alarm rate using various window sizes 
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Fig. 6  Temporal variation of volume metric when system is in normal 
condition, under low rate DDoS attack, and under high rate DDoS attack 
DDoS attacks start at 25th second and end at 50th second. 
400 client machines are used to send TCP traffic. High rate 
attack is performed using 100 zombie machines with mean 
rate 3Mbps per attacker. To perform low rate attack 100 
zombie machines are used with mean rate 0.1Mbps per 
attacker. As shown in figure, it is clear that low rate attacks 
are nearly undetectable when using only volume as statistical 
measure. 
For detection of low rate DDoS attack correctly with low 
false positive rate, flow metric is also considered along with 
volume metric. Fig. 7 shows temporal variation of flow 
metric when (a) system is in normal condition, (b) under 
DDoS attack using 25, 50, 75 and 100 zombie machines. It is 
clear from the fig. 6 and fig. 7, that low rate DDoS attacks 
perform using large number of zombie machines are also 
easily detected using both flow and volume metrics 
simultaneously.  
B. Performance Evaluation Metrics 
We have used three metrics to evaluate performance of our 
proposed DDoS detection approach, namely, detection rate 
(Rd), false positive alarm rate (Rfp), and receiver operating 
characteristic (ROC). The detection rate (Rd) is the measure 
of percentage of attacks detected among all actual attacks 
performed. The detection rate (Rd) is defined as follows: 
Rd =d/n                                     (10) 
   where d is the number of DDoS detected attacks, and n is 
the total number of actual attacks generated during the 
simulation. The false positive alarm rate (Rfp) is the measure 
of percentage of false positives among all normal traffic 
event defined as follows: 
Rfp =f/m                       (11)  
   where f is the number of false positive alarm raised by 
attack detection mechanism, and n is the total number of 
normal traffic flow events during the simulation. The ROC 
curve is used to evaluate tradeoff between detection rate and 
false positive rate. 
C. Simulation Results and Discussion 
As discussed earlier, effectiveness of an anomaly based 
detection system highly depends on accuracy of threshold 
value settings. Inaccurate threshold values cause a large 
number of false positives and false negatives. We use 
tolerance factors to set threshold values accurately. Tolerance 
factors are tunable parameters, which can tune according to 
network condition. Thus, it is possible that values of 
tolerance factors for a particular network environment are not 
suitable for other network. Therefore, various simulations are 
performed using different value of tolerance factors. Then, 
trade-off between detection and false positive rate provides 
guidelines for selecting values of tolerance factors for a 
particular simulation environment. 
    Fig. 8 illustrates the variation of the detection and false 
positive rate with respect to different value of detection 
tolerance factors r1, r2. We can see from the figure, as values 
of tolerance factors increases detection rate which was nearly 
100 tend to decrease after r1>=6 and r1 >=6. However, false 
positive rate is very high for r1>=5 and r1 >=5. So by careful 
investigations, we select optimal value of   r1=6 and r2=6, on 
which detection rate is close to 99% with less than 3% false 
positive rate. Above result demonstrates that detection rate is 
very high with low false positive rate when r1=6 and r2=6. 
The ROC curve in fig. 9 also shows same results.    
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Fig. 7 Effect of detection tolerance factor on the detection and false positive 
rate 
Therefore, value of tolerance factor r1, r2 is taken 6 in our 
approach. Values of r1, r2 can vary for different network 
conditions and correct value can be selected by drawing 
tradeoff between detection and false positive rate.  
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Fig. 8 ROC curve showing the tradeoff between the detection rate and false 
positive rate of DDoS attacks 
V. VALIDATION WITH REAL DATA 
In this section, performance of proposed FVBA scheme is 
evaluated on KDD 99 dataset [28], which is publicly 
available benchmark dataset. We first describe dataset in 
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details, then how it preprocessed according to our specific 
purposes and assumptions. Then FVBA is under training and 
several results are displayed. Finally, we evaluate our 
approach with test data and discuss the results.  
A.  KDD 99 dataset description and preprocessing 
MIT Lincoln Lab’s DARPA intrusion detection evaluation 
datasets have been employed to design and test intrusion 
detection systems [40]. In 1999, Stofo et. al. summarized 
recorded network traffic from the DARPA 98 Lincoln Lab 
dataset into network connections with 41-features per 
connection [28], [41]. This formed the KDD 99 intrusion 
detection benchmark dataset that is most popular dataset used 
to test and evaluate a large number of IDSs. KDD dataset 
covers following four major categories of attacks:  
· Denial of-Service (DoS) attacks (deny legitimate requests 
to a system), e.g. ping-of-death, SYN flood 
· Probing attacks (information gathering attacks), e.g. Port 
scanning 
· Remote-to-Local (R2L) attacks (unauthorized local access 
from a remote machine), e.g. guessing password 
· User-to-Root (U2R) attacks (unauthorized access to local 
super-user or root), e.g. various buffer overflow attacks 
In the present work, our focus is the detection of a wide 
range of DoS attacks. KDD dataset is divided into labeled 
and unlabeled records. Each labeled record consisted of 41 
features and one target value. KDD dataset contains several 
data files, in which we choose two files: 
kddcup.data_10_percent.gz and corrected.gz. In 
kddcup.data_10_percent.gz, there are around 5 million 
(494021) records and it was used for training and validating 
FVBA DDoS detection system. In corrected.gz, there are 
around 3 million (311029) records and it was used for testing 
FVBA detection system.  
Three types of connections are there in KDD dataset: TCP 
connections, UDP connections and ICMP connections. 
Distribution of these connections in both training and testing 
datasets is shown in fig. 10. 
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Fig. 9 Distribution of TCP, UDP and ICMP connections in (a) training 
dataset, (b) testing dataset 
Total 22 and 37 attack types are there in training and 
testing datasets respectively. Table I list the DoS attack types, 
protocol categories and instances in both training and testing 
datasets. We can see that there are 6 and 10 different types of 
DoS attacks in training and testing dataset respectively.  
Each record in dataset has 41 extracted features, in which 
38 features are continuous and others are symbolic. There are 
four categories of derived features, which are 9 intrinsic 
features, 13 content features, 9 traffic features and 10 host 
features.   
TABLE  I: ATTACKS DISTRIBUTION IN (A) TRAINING DATASET, (B) TESTING 
DATASET 
(a) 
DDoS Attack 
Types 
Protocol 
Category 
Instances 
back TCP 2203 
land TCP 21 
neptune TCP 107201 
pod ICMP 264 
smurf ICMP 280790 
teardrop UDP 979 
 
(b) 
DDoS Attack 
Types 
Protocol 
Category 
Instances 
apache2 TCP 794 
back TCP 1098 
land TCP 9 
mailbomb TCP 5000 
neptune TCP 58001 
pod ICMP 87 
processtable TCP 759 
smurf ICMP 164091 
teardrop UDP 12 
udpstorm UDP 2 
 
First, we filter out connection records of DoS attacks 
category and then remove labels from both the training and 
testing dataset. Then normal profile is set for each protocol 
category as each flow is determined by protocol. To set 
normal profile, volume and flow measures are calculated 
using training dataset.  
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B. Training 
Effectiveness of proposed detection system highly 
depends on accuracy of threshold value settings. Inaccurate 
threshold values cause a large number of false positives and 
false negatives. Therefore, various simulations are performed 
using different values of tolerance factors r1 and r2 and r3.  
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Fig. 10 Percentage of detection and false positive rates with varying 
tolerance factors r1 and r2 for TCP connections 
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Fig. 11 Percentage of detection and false positive rates with varying 
tolerance factors r1 and r2 for ICMP connections 
Fig. 11 and 12 illustrates the variation of the detection and 
false positive rate with respect to different values of detection 
tolerance factors r1 and r2 for TCP and ICMP protocol 
category.   
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Fig. 12 Percentage of detection and false positive rates with varying 
tolerance factors r1, r2 and r3 for UDP connections 
We can see, detection rate is 98.0827% with 0.34630% of 
false positives, when r1 =1 and r2=5 for TCP connection. For 
ICMP connection detection rate is 100% with 0.7764% of 
false positives, when r1 =5 and r2=6. Fig. 13 illustrates the 
variation of the detection and false positive rate with respect 
to different values of detection tolerance factors r1, r2 and r3 
for UDP protocol category.  
TABLE  II: OPTIMAL VALUES OF TOLERANCE FACTORS TO SET NORMAL 
PROFILE 
Protocol Tolerance Factors 
Category value 
TCP    r1=1,  r2=5 
UDP    r1=6,  r2=8,  r3=1.5 
ICMP   r1=5,  r2=6 
 
Detection rate is 100% with 0.8656% of false positives, 
when r1 =6, r2=8 and r3=1.5. Therefore, optimal values of 
tolerance factors to set the normal profile are as given in table 
II. 
C. Testing 
After training and validating, we apply proposed detection 
system on test dataset. Table III summarizes the overall 
results of testing for different protocol category.  
TABLE  III: OVERALL RESULTS OF TESTING 
Protocol Category  Total Detected Detection 
Rate (%) 
TCP   Connection 58675/65661 89.36 
UDP   Connection 14/14 100 
ICMP Connection 164178/164178 100 
overall 222867/229853 96.9 
 
Table IV contains summary of different types of DoS 
attacks detected in test dataset. Above stated results show 
that our proposed framework yields 96.9 percent detection 
accuracy with less than 1 percent false alarms. 
TABLE  IV: DOS ATTACKS DETECTION SUMMERY IN TEST DATASET 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, a novel framework is proposed that 
autonomously detects and accurately characterizes a wide 
range of DDoS attacks, ensuring good service to legitimate 
clients. Consideration of varying tolerance factors make 
proposed detection system scalable to the varying network 
conditions and attack loads in real time. Six- sigma method 
enables accurate characterization of malicious flows from 
attack flows. 
In addition to controlled test-bed experiments, 
effectiveness of the proposed system is verified through 
intensive experiments with KDD 99 dataset. Proposed 
system has demonstrated an excellent performance in both 
test-bed experiments and in the real operation. It is found that 
combining flow and volume measures are better way to find 
signs of attack as compared to volume or entropy measure. 
Attack 
Types 
Protocol 
Category 
Total Detected Detection 
Rate (%) 
apache2 TCP 634/794 79.84 
back TCP 1068/1098 97.26 
land TCP 0/9 0 
mailbomb TCP 0/5000 0 
neptune TCP 56973/58001 98.22 
pod ICMP 87/87 100 
processtable TCP 0/759 0 
smurf ICMP 164091/164091 100 
teardrop UDP 12/12 100 
udpstorm UDP 2/2 100 
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We have implemented our approach in single ISP network 
but it can easily be deployed at multiple ISPs with help of 
trusted entities acting as interfaces between two ISPs so that 
two ISPs can share there information and thus more 
effectively stop the attack. The enormous complexity of 
DDoS problem requires a comprehensive solution that 
encompasses multiple stages of the process of defense 
against DDoS attacks. Therefore, investigation of an accurate 
response strategy to complete the framework and strengthen 
the defense against DDoS attacks is a future research issue.  
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